We study how a manufacturer's recycled content claim decision is impacted by demand for recycled content through environmentally preferable purchasing (EPP) programs and supply uncertainty. We model a manufacturer making a recycled content commitment that can commit to a minimum recycled content that holds for every period (product specific claim), or an average recycled content across periods (time aggregated claim).
Introduction

Recycled Content Claims:
Manufacturers often highlight the environmentally friendly features of their products through voluntary recycled content claims. We focus on two types of claims: a 'batch specific claim' in which the manufacturer declares a minimum recycled content that is met for each batch, and a 'batch average claim' in which the average recycled content is met across a number of batches. If the recycled content claim is at 100% then both claims are equivalent. One way consumers can identify batch specific claims on products is by checking whether the claim is qualified as a 'minimum'.
Claims not qualified as a minimum (provided the FTC Green Guides allow it) can be regarded as batch averages.
With an annual purchasing footprint exceeding $500 billion, the green purchasing decisions of the federal government can significantly impact the demand for products containing recycled content (Coggburn and Rahm (2005) ).The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in its Comprehensive Procurement Guidelines gives preference to higher recycled content products as long as price, quality and other factors are competitive, and leaves it to the discretion of the state agency to require whether the recovered materials content of a product be certified on a batchby-batch basis or as an average over a calendar quarter or some other "appropriate averaging period" (EPA CPG (2014) ). Batch-by-batch recycled content levels are preferred, but recycled content averaged over three months or some other appropriate averaging period is also considered acceptable 1 . Most governmental buy recycled programs require some kind of certification to validate the recycled content in products and many third-party certification agencies like SCS Certified offer batch-by-batch certification of products. 2 . We next provide several examples of recycled content claims which are either batch specific or batch average:
• California's State Agency Buy Recycled Campaign (SABRC) is a state mandated program that requires agencies to purchase recycled content products within eleven product categories including printed paper, fiberglass insulation and plastic products, such that the percentage of postconsumer 3 recycled content in the products is greater than or equal to a recommended minimum. For example, glass products (windows, test tubes, fiberglass insulation, glass containers) must contain a minimum of 10 percent postconsumer cullet by weight certified on a batch-by-batch basis; 4 .
• Minimum Content Legislation: California state law mandates that any fiberglass made or sold in California should contain at least 30 percent postconsumer recycled content (Fiberglass Recycled Content Act of 1991) where the recycled content is calculated as an annual batch average.
• The new LEED interpretation ruling states that if the fiberglass content used in a building construction contains at least 10 percent postconsumer content, where the percent in expressed as an annual batch average in a specific plant, then the building gets one credit towards LEED certification and two credits if it contains at least 20 percent PCC 5 .
Despite EPP and buy recycled procurement, manufacturers face uncertainty in supply of recycled input. Most post-consumer recycled input is collected by municipalities under single stream collection, where contamination due to mixing of different waste streams causes the yield of recycled input recovered downstream to be uncertain. The uncertainty in municipal supply and cost of collection outside the municipal stream can impact the recycled content in products. For example, despite being committed to make their packaging with 100% recycled PET (rPET), Nestle Waters North America (NWNA) was only able to incorporate 50% recycled content in all their bottled water packaging due to inadequate supply of quality rPET (Washburn (2013) ). To understand the dual impact of demand benefit and supply uncertainty, we consider a stylized model of a manu-3 Post-consumer content refers to recycled input obtained from products discarded by consumers post-use. 4 www.calrecycle.ca.gov/BuyRecycled/StateAgency/Forms/CalRecycle074.pdf 5 Source:United States Green Building Council & LEED facturer that can impact demand for a single product, for a given final price, by improving on a single environmental attribute -the fraction of recycled content. We then apply the model to the glass wool insulation industry and suggest managerial insights. Next, we describe the key research issues that we investigate in this paper.
Research Goals:
Given an uncertain availability of recycled material, and associated demand side impact of recycled content claims, our research goal is to develop a model that answers the following questions: (a) What are the profit maximizing recycled content claims under a batch specific and a batch average commitment?, (b) Are there parameter values under which making a batch specific or batch average claim leads to both increased manufacturer profits and greater environmental impact?, and (c) How do approaches to stabilize recycled content availability and schemes to increase the demand impact of recycling claims through EPP impact the recycled content claim?
Literature Review
Our paper draws upon literature in research related to sustainable product design, environmental claims, and inventory management. Also relevant is literature on supply uncertainty and recent literature on extended producer responsibility involving mandates on recovery and collection. Here, we discuss the most relevant literature at the intersection of sustainable product design, extended producer responsibility and inventory management.
Several papers in the extant literature have looked at the impact on product design from a sustainability perspective. The design attributes considered have varied from material recyclability (Subramanian et al. (2009) ), product durability (Runkel (2003) ), modularity of the components (Agrawal and Ulku (2013) ), component commonality (Subramanian et al. (2013) ), design for environment (Raz et al. (2013) ) and rate of introduction of new products (Plambeck and Wang (2009) ).
We contribute to this literature by considering the amount of recycled content a manufacturer incorporates in its product and how it is impacted when supply of recycled input is variable. We thus focus on recycled content supply as one of the factors influencing the design of sustainable products.
In the marketing literature, the impact of consumer's increasing appreciation for environmentally friendly products and the marketing impact of sustainability claims made by corporations have been studied by Straughan and Roberts (1999) , Arora and Henderson (2007) and Sen and Bhattacharya (2001) . Peattie (2001) reviews the evolution of "green marketing" and divides the process into three stages: ecological marketing, environmental marketing, and sustainable marketing. Other studies find that as the 'green' consumer segment becomes more sophisticated they examine environmental attributes and related claims more carefully (Ginsberg and Bloom (2004) , Mohr and Webb (2005) ).
Several papers have looked at various types of extended producer responsibility legislation and its impact. Atasu et al. (2009) focus on the design of efficient take back legislation when producers are responsible for end-of-life recycling of their products, while Jacobs and Subramanian (2012) model the impact of sharing responsibility for product recovery between various supply chain partners. In both Atasu et al. (2009) and Jacobs and Subramanian (2012) , the regulator sets mandated collection/recycling targets, while in our model the manufacturer voluntarily chooses a recycled content claim. Atasu and Souza (2011) study the impact of product recovery on a firm's product quality choice and find that product take-back legislation can lead to higher quality choice as opposed to voluntary take-back.
Our paper studies the problem of managing recyclables inventory under two supply sources with one of sources (municipal supply) being random. As such, our paper draws from literature in managing inventory under random yield (Zhou et al. (2011 ), Tao et al. (2012 ) and is similar in structure to papers in the inventory rationing literature (Topkis (1968), Ha (1997) , Benjaafar et al. (2004) ), and the revenue management literature (Talluri and Van Ryzin (2006) ). Our paper is also related to Demeester et al. (2013) , who find that companies benefit by investing in colocation of recycling and production plants. To the best of our knowledge, the link between design attributes like recycled content and recycled input supply when manufacturers making voluntary recycling content claims see a demand benefit has not been explored in literature. Our model will target this gap. We next state our assumptions and formulate the model.
Notation & Assumptions
• Assumption 1: Municipal supply of recycled input every period is independent and identically distributed with a probability density function (pdf) φ() > 0 and distribution function (cdf)
Our model of municipal supply involves a manufacturer that contracts with a municipality to purchase all the collected recyclables at a pre-agreed upon market price. Prices of cullet in recycled glass markets have been reported to be stable with little variation over time (Kusa et al. (2001) ; also see the appendix for historical prices of cullet). Our assumption is that the largest realization of supply from the municipal stream is less than the demand. This assumption is reasonable since imperfect sorting at the consumer end, mixing with other waste streams leading to contamination, and manual sorting at recyclers causes a significant quantity of used products to end up in landfills, so the yield from the municipal recyclables stream is low.
• Assumption 2: Outside the municipal supply, the firm faces a (high) linear cost for collecting recycled input i.e., c e > c m .
Municipal collection is subsidized by consumers who pay for pick up of recyclables along with their trash (e.g., pay-as-you-throw programs) or voluntarily drop off recyclables in a curbside bin. In such cases, the manufacturer does not bear the burden of collection and does not incur the collection cost. However, outside the municipal stream, the manufacturer faces a cost to collect recyclables.
• Assumption 3: Quality of product is unaffected by the amount of recycled content.
In other words, we focus our attention on a single environmental attribute without considering effects of multiple related attributes like quality. An example is container glass and fiberglass manufacturing, where the process involves batch melting of cullet along with raw material to form the final product and the quality of the batch is unaffected by the proportion of cullet used as long as the input cullet used is as per quality specifications (Cook (1978) ).
• Assumption 4: Demand is monotonically increasing in the recycled content claim.
We do not place any restriction on the form of the demand function, only that it be monotone increasing in the recycled content. In addition to increasing in the recycled content, the demand also depends on type of claim being made. The federal government's EPP programs give purchasing preference to batch specific claims while green building standards e.g., LEED certification accept batch average claims.
Under these set of assumptions we formulate our model.
Model Formulation
We formulate the model in two stages:
Stage One (Design Stage): In stage one, the manufacturer declares whether the commitment will be met each batch (batch specific claim), or on average across batches (batch average claim).
Let Ψ i (r) denote the expected stage one profit for a claim type i and recycled content fraction r.
Then the stage one problem is,
wherer is an upper bound on the proportion of recycled content that can be used in a batch subject to technical constraints.
Stage Two (Procurement of recycled input): Stage two is modeled over a finite time horizon consisting of T − periods where a period is defined as time to manufacture a batch of the product.
We model stage two as a stochastic dynamic program with recourse over a T − period time horizon.
Each period the manufacturer sources recycled input to meet the recycled content commitment and satisfy demand, which depends on the recycled content claim in stage one. The manufacturer observes the realization of the random municipal supply at the beginning of each period and can take recourse to non-municipal collection to meet the commitment. While traditional inventory models model carry over finished good inventory, in our model the manufacturer carries recycled input between periods to meet recycled input commitments and demand. The timeline of events is as shown in Figure 1 . Let Π t (x t ) = Profit to go function for periods t to 1 with initial recycled input inventory x t . Then, the stage one expected profit can be written as, Municipal recycled input supply in period t,
demand per period for claim type i ∈ {p, c},
stage one expected profit for claim type i,
maximum expected profit in period t of stage two i.e., x T = 0, the manufacturer starts stage two with no initial inventory of recycled input where,
where
subject to rD p (r) ≤ y t ≤ D p (r) and x + = max(x, 0). The first term in (4) is the revenue from selling D p (r) units of the finished product at price s in period t. The second term is the cost of recycled input received from municipal sources; the third term is the cost if recycled input is collected from non-municipal sources, i.e., if y t is greater than the available supply x t + ξ t ; the remaining demand D p (r) − y t is met with raw material; the fifth term is the cost of holding the remaining recycled input for the next period, and the last term is the optimal profit for the t − 1 period problem with initial recycled input inventory x t−1 = (x t + ξ t − y t ) + . The constraints require that amount of recycled input used each period y t ≥ rD p (r), but not exceed demand i.e, y t ≤ D p (r).
The terminal value function is Π 0 (x) = c m x ∀x ≥ 0, where leftover recycled input is salvaged at cost.
Problem formulation for batch average claim
For the batch average claim, we use an additional state variable, χ t = remaining commitment in period t. If Π t (x t , χ t ) = maximum expected profit for the t period problem with initial inventory x t and remaining commitment χ t , then we can write the stage one expected profit as,
The manufacturer commits to using χ T = T rD c (r) of recycled content across T periods, i.e., rD c (r) on average, and starts stage two with no initial recycled input inventory where,
where x t−1 = (x t + ξ t − y t ) + , χ t−1 = (χ t − y t ) + ∀t, subject to 0 ≤ y t ≤ D c (r) and χ 1 = 0. The terminal value function is Π 0 (x, .) = c m x ∀x ≥ 0. The difference from the batch specific claim is in the presence of an additional state variable, and the last term of (7), where the minimum commitment for the next period is decreased by the amount of recycled input used, i.e., (χ t − y t ) + . The constraint 0 ≤ y t ≤ D c (r) requires that the amount used is non negative, and not exceed demand, while χ 1 = 0 requires that the commitment be satisfied by the end of T periods. In the next section, we provide the optimal actions for the stage two problem for both claim types. The recycled content fraction r is known at this stage. We will solve the stage one problem later. For ease of exposition, we drop the dependence on r and the claim type to write demand D p (r) and D c (r) as D wherever the meaning is unambiguous.
Model Analysis
Optimal Policy of the Batch Specific Claim
Lemma 1. The manufacturer collects recycled input from non-municipal sources in period t only if the available supply x t + ξ t is less than or equal to the minimum commitment rD.
Proof. All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
The manufacturer's commitment requires that a fraction r of demand each period be manufactured using recycled input. Lemma 1 states that if the available total supply from on hand inventory and municipal sources in period t is less than the minimum commitment rD, then the manufacturer resorts to self collection to meet the remaining commitment.
If collection cost is lower than cost of raw material then we expect the manufacturer to collect and satisfy all demand with recycled inputs. If there is no demand benefit (b p = 0) the manufacturer declares no recycled content. Moreover, if the cost of virgin material is greater than municipal recycled input (c v > c m ), then the manufacturer uses all available municipal recycled input in its production and does not self-collect. Our focus in this paper, is on the more interesting case when collection cost c e > c v , and there is a demand benefit to recycled content (b p > 0).
Proposition 1. For a recycled content r, there exist a threshold z t (r), in period t, such that the optimal amount of recycled input used (y * t ) and carried over (z * t ) are given by
, where z t (r) depends only on r, i.e., independent of ξ t ,
Proposition 1 identifies the amount of recycled input used and the amount carried over each period. In Region R 1 , the total supply is less than the minimum commitment, and the manufacturer collects to meet the commitment exactly, but does not exceed it. In Region R 2 , the supply exceeds the commitment, and the manufacturer carries over what is left after meeting the minimum commitment to the next period. In Region R 3 , the manufacturer carries over a threshold amount z t (r) that depends only on the recycled content r and the time index t. The remaining recycled input is used in production. Finally, in Region R 4 , the total supply exceeds demand.
The manufacturer satisfies all demand with recycled input, and carries over the leftover recycled input to the next period. The proposition provides insight into when the manufacturer meets the commitment exactly (Regions R 1 and R 2 ), and when it might choose to exceed the commitment (Regions R 3 and R 4 ). Whether the manufacturer equals or exceeds the commitment depends on realization of municipal supply in the period. The thresholds are decreasing, which means that the manufacturers holds less recycled input near the end of the time horizon. This is intuitive since near the end of the time horizon the manufacturer has fewer periods left to meet the claim and less recycled input is needed for meeting future claim requirements.
Optimal Policy for the Batch Average Claim
Proposition 2. The optimal actions for a batch average recycled content claim are as follows: if
, and y * 1 = max(ξ 1 , χ 1 ), where ξ t is the realization of municipal supply, and χ t the remaining commitment in period t respectively.
Under a batch average claim, the manufacturer has greater flexibility to comply with the commitment and can postpone collection until the final period. Proposition 2 states that the manufacturer defers collection until the final period unless
manufacturer will fall short of the commitment if it defers, even if it uses only recycled input to meet demand in each of the remaining periods. Thus, given the flexibility afforded by aggregation, the manufacturer uses municipal recycled input each period, and only resorts to collection towards the end of the time horizon if it cannot meet the commitment. A batch average claim provides sourcing flexibility by allowing aggregation between periods, whereas in the batch specific claim holding recycled input between periods buffers against supply variability.
Stage One problem
We now turn to the stage one problem, where the manufacturer chooses the recycled content fraction, and type of claim to maximize the expected profit. Since we do not assume a specific functional form for demand, Ψ i (r) need not be concave. To gain insight, we solve the stage one problem for T = 2, and use numerical results to explore the impact of many (T > 2) batches. In
Proposition 3, we first provide conditions for existence of a unique recycled content decision (r) for the batch average claim. In Proposition 4, we show that analogous conditions hold for the batch specific claim.
Proposition 3. For the batch average claim, if D c (r) is log-concave in r, and 1 +
then Ψ c (r) has an optimum that is given by the unique root of
where Φ 12 is the cumulative distribution function of the random variable representing total municipal
Under a batch average claim, the manufacturer commits to using a quantity 2rD c (r) of recycled input across the two periods. The manufacturer chooses the optimum recycled content fraction to balance the marginal revenue with the expected future marginal cost. The first term is the product of the marginal demand, 2D c (r), and the base margin s − c v , i.e., the profit margin if raw material was used to meet the marginal demand. The marginal cost is composed of three terms: the first term is the difference between the unit cost of collection and purchasing raw material; the second term is
; the third term is the lookahead probability that the manufacturer will resort to collection in stage two, which occurs if the total municipal supply is less than the commitment, i.e., with probability
Proposition 3 thus gives the tradeoffs in incorporating a greater recycled content in the design stage (stage one): (1) an increase in demand leading to an increase in revenue, (2) an increase in the recycled content commitment, and (3) a greater likelihood of collection in stage two. The first order condition in (9) confirms the intuition that changes at the product design stage should account for the impact on expected future revenues and costs.
Figure 2: Plot of the amount carried over z * 2 versus r for a fixed ξ 2 under the batch specific claim (r 2 > 1).
Corollary 1. For a batch specific recycled content claim r, and realization of municipal supply ξ 2 the optimum amount carried over to period one is given by
For a batch specific claim, Corollary 1 gives the optimum amount carried over for a fixed ξ 2 , and Figure 2 shows how it varies with the recycled content. The regions are the same as that defined in Proposition 1 except that R 4 = {∅}, since the starting inventory x 2 = 0, and by assumption we have
In Region R 1 , the manufacturer does not carry over since all municipal supply has been used to satisfy the claim; in Region R 2 , the manufacturer carries over all remaining municipal supply after meeting the minimum commitment ξ 2 − rD; in Region R 3 , the manufacturer carries over z 2 (r), i.e., the amount it would carry over if the municipal supply was not constrained. Figure   2 depicts the fundamental trade off in our model of a recycled content decision and the concomitant supply constraint. Using a linear demand, for different r, the figure shows D(r), rD(r), ξ 2 − rD(r), and z 2 (r). The curve in bold shows how the amount carried over z * 2 varies with r. For a low value of r (close to zero), the municipal supply is sufficient to meet the commitment, and there is no carry over. For a high value of r (close to one), the municipal supply is insufficient, and again there is no carry over. For a value in between, the manufacturer carries recycled input till it is constrained by available supply. Figure 2 shows how the recycled content choice impacts downstream operations through the amount carried between periods. It also identifies the Regions R 1 , R 2 , and R 3 defined in Proposition 1. We next provide the uniqueness result for the batch specific claim.
Proposition 4 provides conditions under which the stage one expected profit has a unique maximum for a batch specific claim. We find that conditions on the demand function, specifically that the demand is log-concave in r, and that (rD p (r)) > D p (r) is sufficient to ensure a unique optimum. The latter condition requires that for an increase in recycled content, the recycled input commitment increases at a faster rate than the demand and guarantees that the amount of virgin material consumed ((1 − r)D p (r)) is decreasing in the recycled content claim. For a linear demand function D p (r) = a + b p · r, this condition is true if a > b p i.e., the base demand exceeds the slope of the demand function. Note that we do not require conditions on the supply distribution, except that it be continuous and differentiable. Propositions 3 and 4 allow us to compare the optimum batch specific and batch average recycled content claims.
Comparing the Batch Specific and Batch Average Claims
In this section, we will compare the profits and recycled content for both claims and examine how these change with demand benefit for batch specific claims through EPP. To simplify the discussion and obtain insights, we use a linear relationship between the demand and recycled content D c (r) = a + b c r, and D p (r) = a + b p r. Further, for illustrative purposes, we demonstrate our results when the manufacturer does not carry recyclables between periods i.e., mathematically we let h → ∞. The implications of not allowing carry over of supply is relevant when manufacturers declare claims over larger number of batches i.e., annual, half-yearly or quarterly batch averages.
Moreover, some manufacturers may not wish to hold recyclables for long periods of time due to contamination concerns or space restrictions.
In Lemma 2, we first establish the directional results for the base case when b p = b c . We then look at the how the profits and recycled content claim change as b p increases in Proposition 5. Finally, we give a sufficient condition when EPP increases profits and recycled content in Proposition 6. 
where µ is the mean of the municipal supply.
The proposition states that the greater flexibility in using recycled input makes the batch average claim more profitable in the absence of any revenue side benefits. However, it is not straightforward that the manufacturer's recycled content commitment will also be greater. The manufacturer's commitment under a batch specific claim can be greater under a lower collection cost. This can be seen by noting that since the marginal revenue from recycled content is same for both claims, the direction of the claims depends only on the marginal cost.
If the municipal supply were deterministic, the manufacturer would declare a recycled content at the mean supply i.e., rD(r) = µ. With variability in supply, the manufacturer declares a claim that is around the mean. If the collection cost is lower (higher) than a threshold, then the recycled content commitment is greater (lower) than the mean. Further, for the batch average claim, pooling the municipal supply across the two periods to meet the claim reduces the variability in supply as compared to a batch specific claim. The net effect is that if the cost of collection is higher than the threshold i.e., the manufacturer commits lower than the mean, a lower variability around the mean benefits the manufacturer by increasing the amount of recycled input supply. On the other hand, if the cost of collection is lower than the threshold i.e., the manufacturer commits greater than the mean, a higher variability in municipal supply benefits the manufacturer by meeting a greater share of the commitment from municipal supply.
A batch specific claim thus, results in a lower (higher) marginal cost when collection cost is lower (higher) than the threshold and is greater (lower) than the batch average. Put differently, the batch specific claim benefits from the upside of a higher than usual municipal supply when the collection cost is lower than the threshold, which the time averaged claim forgoes, and this increases it in comparison. Lemma 2 thus highlights that a tighter batch specific claim leads to a greater (lower) commitment and recycled content if the collection cost is lower (higher) than a threshold.
Having shown that the profits and recycled content for the claims need not be ordered in the same direction, we next ask: What effect does increasing b p through EPP have on profits and recycled content claims?
Proposition 5. If the demand benefit increases from
exists a thresholdc e (b 1 , b 2 ) such that if c e >c e (b 1 , b 2 ) then the optimum recycled content claim is
In the presence of demand side benefits for batch specific claims like EPP, a manufacturer making a batch specific claim sees higher profits. However, EPP does not always increase the recycled content claim. Proposition 5 states that if the cost of collection is sufficiently high then demand side incentives like EPP may cause the manufacturer to reduce the recycled content. This happens due to an increased demand benefit also entailing a greater commitment (for the same r, if D p (r) increases then rD p (r) also increases), which can decrease profits. Thus, EPP alone may not be sufficient to encourage products with greater recycled content -supply issues also matter.
We now give a sufficient condition when EPP increases profits and recycled content levels.
Proposition 6 suggests that demand incentives under low collection costs can create win-win situations. Note that we have stated a sufficient condition where a small increase in b p over b c guarantees win-win. This is because the condition requires c e to be quite low. In our model parametrization, we find that b p has to be sufficiently higher than b c to ensure greater profits and higher recycled content. Thus, EPP can incentivize manufacturers to make batch specific claims that lead to higher profits. However, to ensure that the resultant recycled content is also greater, policy makers should address supply issues involving the cost of collection (c e ) and the municipal supply.
Effect of municipal supply variability on recycled content
We next examine the another aspect of supply, i.e., effect of variability of municipal supply. Many municipalities consolidate the recyclables stream, i.e, recyclables like plastics, paper and glass are collected in a single bin. It is argued that by reducing the sorting effort on part of the residents, a municipality can encourage residents to divert greater amount of recyclables from the regular waste stream (trash) that ends up in landfill. However, commingling of recyclables into a single bin also leads to significant contamination. In Proposition 7, we examine whether efforts to decrease supply variability in the municipal stream and ensure a more consistent supply to the manufacturer can have a favorable impact on the manufacturer's recycled content decision. We do this by letting the variability reduction be a mean preserving spread.
Proposition 7. Let X be a random variable with mean µ and X α = αX + (1 − α)µ, a mean preserving transformation of X, represent the municipal supply each period and b p = b c = b. Then the manufacturer's expected profit decreases in α. The optimal recycled content claim increases
. Moreover, the magnitude of the increase (decrease) is greater (smaller) for the batch specific recycled content claim than the batch average claim.
If α = 0, then X 0 = µ. As α increases the random variable X α "spreads out" around the mean. Proposition 7 states that decreasing α, i.e., lowering the variability of the supply stream, keeping mean the same, increases both manufacturer profits and the recycled content claim only if the cost of non-municipal collection is higher than a threshold. If instead, the cost is lower than the threshold then reducing variability decreases the recycled content claim. The result can be explained in the same way as Lemma 2 by noting that the when the collection cost is lower (higher) than the threshold, the recycled input commitment is greater (lower) than the mean, and lowering the variability increases (decreases) the marginal cost, by reducing (increasing) the share of the municipal supply in the commitment.
5 Application to the Glass Wool Industry & Managerial Insights
Industry Application
Data for this analysis was obtained from a glass recycling study performed by the Division of
Recycling & Litter Prevention in Ohio 6 . We used collection cost estimates provided in the report and supplement it with demand for recycled content fiberglass from LEED standards. We used this data to explore the dual impact of a supply side intervention through separate collection of glass (dual-stream) and demand side through Environmentally Preferable Purchasing. In what follows, we first describe use of recycled glass in fiberglass manufacturing, explain how we derived the parameters for our study and parameterize the model.
Use of Cullet in Container Glass and Fiberglass manufacturing:
The In Ohio, the fiberglass (glass wool) insulation industry is one of the largest users of glass cullet. The fiberglass industry utilizes cullet obtained from container and plate glass (e.g. from windshields). The use of glass cullet in fiberglass this represents an example of downcycling, which is the recovery and reuse of materials for products other than their original use. In our model, this decouples supply of cullet (which comes from various sources) with demand for fiberglass insulation 8 .
Fiberglass is manufactured in batches in a process similar to container glass, where finely ground raw materials which includes silica, sand, limestone, boron, and cullet are weighted according to the recipe, mixed and spun into fibers. The EPA's Waste Reduction Model (WARM) states that fiberglass insulation from recycled cullet requires less energy -For every 10 percent of recycled content in fiberglass insulation, the manufacturing energy needs decrease by 3.25 percent (warm (2014)).
The current maximum recycled content in fiberglass is 58% which includes 36% post-consumer content, though industry representatives state that fiberglass insulation containing upwards of 90% recycled glass is technically feasible 9 . The main issue seems to be supply of uncontaminated cullet.
Cullet obtained as source separated is usually very clean "furnace ready cullet", where as cullet obtained from commingled curbside collection is contaminated from metals, organic material and ceramics 10 . Moreover, optical sorting and removal of contamination requires material size of recovered cullet to be no lower than 3 8
th of an inch 11 . To be used in manufacturing, cullet needs to be cleaned of contaminants (e.g., metals, ceramics, and organic material) and ground to a specific size. Next, we calibrate the demand and supply parameters of our model.
Demand for recycled content:
Fiberglass insulation is the most widely used insulation material worldwide and accounted for over half of the US market in 2011. Manufacturers of fiberglass insulation containing recycled content see demand from state governments (EPP), large commercial building projects (LEED) and residential buildings (NAHB), all having varying levels of recycled content requirements. We calibrate the demand side with LEED certification data. In 2011, the United States Mid-west region saw close to 100 million square feet of LEED certified construction 12 , which consisted of LEED Certified (16%), 9 Source: http://www.doi.gov/greening/buildings/upload/iEnvironmental-Considerations-of-BuildingInsulation-National-Park-Service-insulation.pdf 10 Maximum tolerance is roughly 500 parts per million for organic contamination 11 In single-stream systems, it is virtually impossible to prevent glass from breaking, as it goes to the curb, is loaded in the truck where it gets compacted, and offloaded onto conveyor belts to be processed by the MRF Source: ContainerRecyclingInstitute.
12 http://www.usgbc.org/articles/list-top-10-states-leed-green-buildings-released LEED Silver (34%), LEED Gold (35%) and LEED Platinum (15%) 13 . Von Paumgartten (2003) reports that a campus building in University of California in Santa Barbara, which was LEED Gold certified, used insulation containing between 35−100% recycled content. Construction specific data can be used to estimate the recycled content levels in fiberglass used in various LEED ratings and buildings. For the purpose of our analysis, we assume that LEED certified buildings used building insulation with post-consumer recycled content uniformly distributed between 0 and 100 percent 14 .
An average construction uses 0.85 pounds of fiberglass insulation per square foot, and with 50% market share this represents potential recycled-content fiberglass demand of 19.25 thousand tons in our analysis 15 . Green Construction (2014) estimates that federal, state and local governments contributed to over 27% of LEED-registered projects i.e., 5.2 thousand tons, with the rest 14.05 thousand tons going toward private LEED-certified projects. We used this to set the elasticity parameter for demand b c = 1.4 thousand tons (certified as annual average), and for EPP b p = 1.92.
We estimated the green building market to be 30% of total non-residential construction 16 , and we used this to set the base "non-green" demand at 230 million square feet of construction space. With a fiberglass market share of 50%, this gives a base "non-green" demand of a = 45 thousand tons.
Supply:
The per capita generation of glass in Ohio (consisting of beverage, food container glass and plate glass) from residential and commercial sources was 68 pounds in 2011. At 2011 scrap prices for post-consumer container glass (sorted clear) of $25 per ton (see appendix), the glass recovery rate 13 LEED points are awarded based on a recycled credit calculation -for each building material, the recycled content value, which equals the recycled content weight of the material multiplied by the cost, is calculated and the weighted sum is evaluated, and the LEED certification awarded on the weighted sum. Clearly, the contribution of recycled content fiberglass varies depending on the overall composition of the building material and can vary widely between projects. Since, we did not have data related to the exact composition of projects, we used estimates.
14 We assume building insulation for obtaining LEED rating, were chosen primarily for recycled content levels, and assuming cost/structural properties is not a factor. Plastic, Non-Woven Batt is known to contain 100% recycled content Source: http://www.doi.gov/greening/buildings/upload/iEnvironmental-Considerations-of-BuildingInsulation-National-Park-Service-insulation.pdf 15 100 million square ft * 0.85 lbs sqf t *0.453 kgs lb * 0.5/1000 = 19, 250 tons.
Our demand estimates are conservative since we consider only LEED construction. However, non-LEED residential construction (NAHB certified) also represents a large demand, but we did not have access to this data 16 www.usgbc.org/Docs/Archive/General/Docs18693.pdf The manufacturer can self-collect cullet or source from outside the municipal stream. Table 2 lists the non-municipal sources and the per-ton costs that can be used to supplement manufacturer supply of cullet and the cost estimates provided from the report. Table 3 summarizes the parameter values used. Next, we present the results for the parameterized model.
We report the manufacturer profits, recycled content claim, recycled input used, and annual diversion of recyclables from landfills due to manufacturer self-collection for an annual time horizon with averaging over different number of batches. To do this, we start with T = 1 (annual batch average), and increase T by splitting the year into smaller time intervals i.e, T = 2 (half-yearly 17 'Recovery Rate' represents the percentage of generated glass that was recovered by the municipality for recycling (residential + commercial) 18 Cook (1978) states that the municipality collects until it breaks even i.e., till the marginal cost of collection equals the scrap value of $25 per ton. In 2011, this number was $54, 395 tons 19 The report also estimates the yield from container deposit system to be 0.98 20 The cost includes collection cost and processing the material (remove contaminants etc.) for use by the glass industry. Bars and Restaurants are more concentrated users of glass products, hence the lower cost per ton, but bar and restaurant glass also tends to be more contaminated from ceramics. batch average), T = 4 (quarterly batch average) and T = 8 (batch specific) 21 . Correspondingly, we also split the demand and supply appropriately each period. Thus, for T = 1, if the annual supply is µ, standard deviation is σ, annual demand is D(r), then for each period of the T period problem, the mean supply is µ T , standard deviation is σ √ T , and demand is D(r) T . Table 4 shows the manufacturer's profits for each claim type when batch specific claims are given purchasing preference by government EPP for b p = 1.92 and b p = 40. We note that at the current levels of EPP, b p = 1.92, batch specific claims see lower profits that annual batch average claims.
However, with batch-specific claims the manufacturer also diverts more recyclables from the landfill in addition to incorporating more recycled input leading to lower manufacturing emissions. It is interesting to note that a manufacturer making a batch specific claim declares a greater recycled content claim than a batch average claim. The direction of the claims mirrors that in Lemma 2 i.e, the batch specific claim is greater than the batch average claim when collection cost is lower than a threshold. In the glass industry, furnaces are run continuously and must be set for a given mix of cullet and other inputs. The plant operator must ensure there is sufficient cullet to maintain the feed rate and typically, furnaces are not shut down in periods shorter than a month 22 . Accordingly, in our analysis batch specific claims must be met over every 1.5 months i.e., T = 8. A higher value of b p indicates greater share of public construction which can lead to a greater demand benefit. Table 4 shows that for b p = 40 for batch specific claims, EPP increases the manufacturer profits and recycled content claims to be greater than annual batch average claims.
The values in bold show that the batch specific claim is Pareto improving compared to the annual batch average claim. When the magnitude of EPP is high, batch specific claims can be given purchasing preference to increase manufacturer profits and maximum diversion from the landfill.
States with greater magnitude of public construction such as California and Washington 23 are good candidates for EPP which gives purchasing preference to batch specific claims. In Ohio, current levels of EPP are not sufficient to incentivize batch specific claims. However, several states are requiring greater share of public construction be LEED certified. We explored the impact with an increased b p = 10 on batch specific claims. Table 5 shows that with b p = 10, though batch specific has lower profits than annual batch average, Pareto improving conditions can be achieved if EPP gave preference to quarterly batch average claims. Hence, our recommendation is that states where magnitude of EPP is large (e.g., California, Washington) batch specific claims can be encouraged, whereas states will lower magnitudes of EPP, quarterly or half-yearly batch averages can be considered. Table 6 shows that with a higher collection cost c e = 1000$/ton the recycled content claim, recycled input and manufacturer profit is maximized for the annual batch average claim. Manufacturers voluntarily prefer to make annual batch average claims which also uses greater recycled input leading to lowering of manufacturing emissions. Thus from a policy makers perspective, when a manufacturer's collection cost of recyclables is as above, then encouraging annual batch average claims would ensure manufacturers profits are maximized and manufacturers voluntarily use greater amount of recycled input. However, at this collection cost the manufacturer does not self-collect i.e, there is no diversion from the landfill.
In Table 7 we look at the effect of the municipalities moving to dual stream collection of recyclables. Dual stream collection increases the yield of the municipal stream (net of collection and processing) compared to single stream. It is also expected to reduce variability in the supply due to less commingling and contamination of recyclables. We chose a coefficient of variation for dual stream ρ d = 0.32 compared to single stream ρ s = 0.36, so that dual stream increased mean supply but the variance did not increase as much as single stream collection. Table 7 shows that dual stream recycling increases manufacturer profits and recycled content claims due to greater yield of cullet in the municipal stream. The manufacturer is less reliant on self-collection to meet the claim hence the annual diversion from the landfills in lower. However, at current EPP levels in Ohio, moving to dual stream does not lead to increased diversion. The manufacturers continue to declare annual batch averages -however, the recycled content levels increase. Table 7 also shows that supply side intervention through dual stream recycling combined with EPP at b p = 40 can increase manufacturer profits and improve recycled content levels compared
with Table 4 . This shows that combining of supply and demand intervention can be used to achieve Pareto improving outcomes. 
Managerial Insights
Environmentally Preferable Purchasing (EPP) under supply constraints:
When there is no preferential purchasing of products with batch specific claims, manufacturers make batch average claims since averaging allows greater flexibility in meeting the commitment by pooling supply across periods. Lack of batch specific claims thus indicates absence of downstream demand for such claims. The US government's Environmentally Preferable Purchasing encourages manufacturers to voluntarily make batch specific claims exceeding LEED requirements.
From the policy perspective, it is an interesting question -which type of claims should the government give purchasing preference to? Moreover, when can Pareto improving conditions which ensure greater manufacturer profits and voluntarily higher recycled content claims be obtained?
We find that if the collection costs outside the municipal stream are extremely high and the state practices single stream collection of recyclables, policy makers should encourage annual average claims. Doing so, would allow manufacturers to retain higher profit and voluntarily use more recycled input in production. In states, where the magnitude of EPP is very large due large public construction e.g. California and Washington, encouraging batch specific claim might be Pareto optimal. In states such as Ohio, where collection costs are relatively lower and there is plenty of untapped supply from bars and restaurants, batch average claims may not lead to higher profits compared to batch averages if the magnitude of EPP is not large enough. In such states, a quarterly or half-yearly batch average for EPP might be more appropriate. Whether voluntary batch specific claims lead to Pareto improving outcomes depends on the magnitude of the demand benefit due to EPP.
Concerted effort of demand side and supply side (through moving to dual stream for at least part of the municipalities) can improve manufacturer profits and use of recycled input in production, thus reducing manufacturing emissions. Moving to dual stream collection of recyclables can thus supplement the demand benefit provided by EPP and lead to Pareto improving outcomes.
However, the outcomes from single vs. dual stream also depend on the variability in each collection scheme. More analysis should be done as to the supply situation in each states before adoption either demand-or supply-intervention.
Reducing manufacturer collection cost through bottle bills:
Another way to achieve pareto improving outcomes as shown in Proposition 6 is to reduce collection cost through legislation like container deposit laws, also known as 'bottle bills', which provide financial incentives to consumers to divert recyclables from the municipal stream. Bottle bills are deposit laws that charge a 5-or 10-cent deposit from consumers at the time of sale and refund it when the consumer returns the used bottle to an authorized retailer or at designated reverse vending locations. Encouraging consumers to return used bottles reduces manufacturer travel distances to collect the used bottles than without a bottle bill (since consumers travel part of the way to deposit the bottle and manufacturers can pick up the used bottle from retailers in their delivery return route). Further, diverting recyclables from the municipal stream (lowerĀ) makes the manufacturer less dependent on the variable municipal stream.
(c e ) bottle bill < (c e ) w/o bottle bill
The EPP demand benefit drives manufacturer profitability and lower non-municipal collection cost (and dependence on the variable municipal stream) through bottle bills results in greater recycled content being used. The net effect (Proposition 6) is that manufacturers switch from making batch average claims to batch specific claims that are higher and more profitable. The discussion thus far looked at the impact of two levers -demand incentives for recycled content and municipal collection mechanism -single vs. dual stream. We find that impact of these levers depends on the manufacturer's cost of collection from non-municipal sources. Finally, policy with regard to demand incentives for recycled content should be tailored to supply limitations.
Extensions
Our model and assumptions are specific to the industry context of glass and fiberglass production, since quality of glass is unaffected by the amount of recycled content. However, there are industries where quality of the product might depend on the recycled content of the product for e.g., printing & copy paper. An interesting extension is investigating whether the final price of the product increases to maintain the same quality for the consumer. Many EPP programs give price ranges for purchasing recycled products -usually prices 5-10% greater than virgin products are acceptable.
In this case, the demand curve is unchanged, but the firms revenue increases due to the higher price. However, the cost effect of maintaining quality also needs to be explored. These are some considerations a future extension can consider.
Further, while we have considered uncertainty in supply of recycled input over time, where a firm produces in multiple locations, there could be more variation in the availability of recycled materials across geographical regions than over time. The observation is even more pertinent in light of the recent LEED Interpretation Ruling that disallowed making recycled content claims averaged across several different plants i.e., claims made about a product must be specific to the plant it is manufactured in. Considering the problem of geographical variation in availability and supply represents a interesting extension to our paper.
Finally, though the supply and demand are uncorrelated for the glass wool industry, it may not be true for other recyclables like container glass, paper products, aluminum etc. A future extension to other recyclables should consider the closed loop from the demand for recyclables feeding the supply. A future extension can also allow for uncertainty in the recyclables recovered from nonmunicipal sources. In this case, the model might have to levy a penalty in case the firm violates the claim in a period due to unavailable supply from both municipal and non-municipal sources. Runkel, Marco. 2003 . Product durability and extended producer responsibility in solid waste management. 
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Sensitivity to holding cost
We show the sensitivity of the recycled content claims and result in Lemma 2 to finite holding cost values. results with a finite holding cost mirrors that for the infinite holding cost case: when the collection cost is sufficiently high (low), the optimal batch specific claim is lower (greater) than the annual batch average claim. We next provide the main managerial insights from the analysis thus far.
Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
In period t, if x t + ξ t < rD then we have,
If c e > c v the manufacturer solves,
Noting that the optimum y * t ≤ x t + ξ t (for y t > x t + ξ t slope is negative), the problem can be rewritten in terms of z t = x t + ξ t − y t as,
subject to (x t + ξ t − D) + ≤ z t ≤ x t + ξ t − rD. In other words, the manufacturer carries over z * t to the next period, where z * t solves
subject to (x t + ξ t − D) + ≤ z t ≤ x t + ξ t − rD, and y * t = x t + ξ t − z * t .
Proof of Proposition 1
It is trivial to note that y * t = D if c e ≤ c v . We use induction to prove the proposition if c e > c v .
Clearly in period one the manufacturer will use up all the recycled input available x 1 + ξ 1 and salvage leftover recycled input at end of the period. Setting z 1 (r) = 0 gives the corresponding optimum actions for period one. We first show that the result is true in period two. The expected profit in period one is,
which gives,
Π 1 (x 1 ) is concave in x 1 , since Π 1 (x 1 ) is decreasing in x 1 . Note that Π 1 (x 1 ) ≤ c e . In period two, if
x 2 + ξ 2 < rD then from Lemma 1, y * 2 = rD. If x 2 + ξ 2 > rD the manufacturer solves (15). The first order condition is,
subject to (x 2 + ξ 2 − D) + ≤ z 2 ≤ x 2 + ξ 2 − rD. Since Π 1 is concave, G 2 (z 2 ) is concave in z 2 . Let z 2 (r) be the unique positive root of G 2 (z 2 ) = 0. Note that the expression is independent of x 2 and ξ 2 . (If it does not does not have a positive root we set z 2 (r) = 0). Then the optimum actions in period two can be written as,
This proves the proposition for the two period problem. We now assume that the following is true for period t − 1 (t ≥ 2) and prove for period t, i.e, assuming that, A1) Π l (x) is concave and Π l (x) ≤ c e for all x and 1 ≤ l ≤ t − 1,
we show,
, B2) Π t (x) is concave in x with Π t (x) ≤ c e for all x,
Induction assumption (A1) implies that G t (z t ) is concave in z t . Then, similar to period two, (B1) can be directly inferred. We now show (B2) using (B1). The period-t expected profit is,
To show Π t (x) is concave, we will show that Π t (x, ξ) is concave in x for any given ξ. Since a convex combination of concave functions is concave, this implies that Π t (x) is concave in x. For a given ξ we have,
Let z t (r) > 0 (if z t (r) = 0 the proof is similar). From (A1), since Π t−1 (x) ≤ c e we have,
Then since both Π t−1 (x + ξ − rD) and Π t−1 (x + ξ − D) are decreasing in
x we have shown that dΠ t (x, ξ) dx is decreasing in x i.e. Π t (x, ξ) is concave in x for a given ξ. Noting also that Π t (x) ≤ c e we have shown (B2). We will show (B3) and (B4) using (A2) and (A3). If z t (r) = 0 then the result is trivial. We will prove for z t (r) > 0. Using (22) we can write, = −h + E x+ξ<rD (c e − c v ) + E rD≤x+ξ<rD+zt(r) (G t (x + ξ − rD)) + E x+ξ≥D+zt(r) (G t (x + ξ − D)) = −h + E x+ξ<rD (c e − c v ) + E rD≤x+ξ<rD+z t−1 (r) (G t (x + ξ − rD)) + E rD+z t−1 (r)≤x+ξ<rD+zt(r) (G t (x + ξ − rD)) + E x+ξ≥D+zt(r) (G t (x + ξ − D))
where in the last expression the region rD ≤ x + ξ < rD + z t (r) has been split into rD ≤ x + ξ < rD + z t−1 (r) and rD + z t−1 (r) ≤ x + ξ < rD + z t (r) since by (A2) z t (r) ≥ z t−1 (r). Also, G t (x) = −h − c v + dΠ t−1 (x) dx = −h + E x+ξ<rD (c e − c v ) + E rD≤x+ξ<rD+z t−1 (r) (G t−1 (x + ξ − rD)) + E x+ξ≥D+z t−1 (r) (G t−1 (x + ξ − D))
We will compare the above two expressions to show (B3) and (B4). The first two terms are the same in both expressions. If x ≤ z t (r), the last term in the expression for G t+1 (x) is 0 (since ξ <Ā < D) while the corresponding term in G t (x) is negative (since by (A1), Π t−2 (x) is concave in x). Using (A3), the third term in G t+1 (x) is greater than or equal the corresponding term in G t (x). The fourth term in G t+1 (x) is non negative (using (A1)). Comparing term by term we have G t+1 (x) ≥ G t (x) for all x ≤ z t (r) if z t (r) > 0, which shows (B4). This implies that G t+1 (z t (r)) ≥ G t (z t (r)) = 0 which along with (A2) gives (B3). Lastly, if z t−1 (r) = 0 then the third term in both G t+1 (x) and G t (x) are 0 and the same argument as before applies. This completes the induction.
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof follows by noting that the manufacturer can maximize profits by deferring collection till period one when all uncertainty in supply has been resolved. In period one, the manufacturer must meet any remaining commitment therefore, y * 1 = max(ξ 1 , χ 1 ). In each of the other periods the manufacturer uses up all the municipal supply y * t = ξ t , and defers collection unless ξ t < χ t −(t−1)D.
If ξ t < χ t −(t−1)D the manufacturer will fall short of the commitment if it defers, even if it uses only recycled input to meet demand in each of the remaining t−1 periods. Thus, if ξ t < χ t −(t−1)D, the manufacturer collects up to y * t = χ t −(t−1)D; if ξ t ≥ χ t −(t−1)D the manufacturer uses up all the municipal supply, y * t = ξ t and updates the next periods minimum commitment i.e, χ t−1 = (χ t −ξ t ) + and x t−1 = 0. Note that the manufacturer never carries over recycled input, since every unit of recycled input used in the current period goes towards meeting the commitment unlike the product specific case, where any recycled input that exceeds the periods minimum commitment does not count towards future commitments.
Proof of Proposition 3
We have, Ψ c (r) = Π 2 (0, 2rD) = E ξ 2 Π 2 (0, 2rD, ξ 2 ) 
Proof of Proposition 4
We first derive the two period expected profit for the product specific claim. The steps of the derivation can be provided upon request by the authors. Here, we directly state the first derivative and give conditions under which there exists a unique optimum. We have,
where, 
and k(r) = 
For a fixed r, as α increases, X α becomes (second order) stochastically smaller i.e., the last term decreases. Thus, the manufacturer's optimum expected profit decreases with increase in α. This completes the proof.
